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Abstract
In this paper, we provide new empirical evidence on order submission activity and
price impacts of limit orders at NASDAQ. Employing NASDAQ TotalView-ITCH
data, we ﬁnd that market participants dominantly submit limit orders with sizes
equal to a round lot. Most limit orders are canceled almost immediately after
submission if not getting executed. Moreover, only very few market orders walk
through the book, i.e., directly move the best ask or bid quote. Estimates of
impulse-response functions on the basis of a cointegrated VAR model for quotes
and market depth allow us to quantify the market impact of incoming limit orders.
We propose a method to predict the optimal size of a limit order conditional on
its position in the book and a given ﬁxed level of expected market impact.
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11 Introduction
Electronic limit order book (LOB) systems are the dominant trading form of most ﬁ-
nancial markets worldwide, including leading exchanges like NASDAQ, NYSE, BATS
and Euronext, various Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs) and Electronic Communica-
tion Networks (ECNs). The recent decade witnesses substantial technological progress
in trading systems as well as trade recording and an increasing importance of intra-
day trading. Transparency, low latency, high liquidity and low trading costs attract
an increasing number of intraday traders, long-horizon traders as well as institutional
investors. Though electronic limit order book trading already exists for many years,
further developments in trading systems and structures are ongoing and are faster
than ever before. The successive automatization of order management and execution
by computer algorithms, the growing importance of smart order routing as well as
changes of market structures and trading forms challenge empirical and theoretical
market microstructure research.
The objective of this paper is to provide new empirical evidence on order activities
and market dynamics at NASDAQ – the largest electronic market for equities in the
U.S. By employing TotalView-ITCH data containing information directly stemming
from the NASDAQ data feed, our study sheds some light on recent order arrival rates,
execution rates, cancellation rates and the price impact of incoming quotes. Particularly
the market impact of a limit order is a key parameter for trading decisions and play
a crucial role for (algorithmic) trading strategies. Also theoretical studies, such as,
e.g., Harris (1997), Parlour and Seppi (2007), Boulatov and George (2008) or Rosu
(2010), predict that the revelation of a trading intention by limit order placements
can indeed adversely aﬀect asset prices. Despite of its importance, empirical evidence
on the inﬂuence of incoming limit orders is still limited. Only very recently, Hautsch
and Huang (2009), Eisler, Bouchaud, and Kockelkoren (2009) and Cont, Kukanov,
and Stoikov (2011) analyze the price impact of limit orders and ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects.
In this study, we employ Hautsch and Huang’s (2009) framework, which extends the
approach by Engle and Patton (2004) and provides deeper insights into the market
impact of limit orders in recent NASDAQ trading. Of particular interest is whether the
magnitudes of price impacts identiﬁed in other markets are also found in the extremely
2liquid NASDAQ market and which limit order sizes can be ultimately posted without
signiﬁcantly moving the market.
TotalView-ITCH data contains all order messages and thus allows us to reconstruct
the NASDAQ limit order book in a very precise way, particularly accounting for all
high-frequency limit order activities including also so-called ﬂeeting orders. The lat-
ter are present for only few seconds and have the purpose of testing for hidden orders
placed in the bid-ask spread. A detailed analysis of the NASDAQ order ﬂow in October
2010 provides the following major results: First, the number of limit order submissions
is twenty to forty higher than the number of trades. Secondly, limit order sizes are
typically small and clustered at round lot sizes of hundred shares. Third, more than
95% of all limit orders are cancelled without getting executed with most of them being
cancelled nearly instantaneously (less than one second) after their submission reﬂecting
the proliferation of algorithmic trading at NASDAQ. Fourth, volume-weighted execu-
tion times are signiﬁcantly greater than average execution times indicating that large
orders face more execution risk than small ones.
The market impact of limit orders is quantiﬁed by modeling ask and bid quotes and
several levels of depth in terms of a cointegrated vector-autoregressive (VAR) system
which is updated in event time. Short-run and long-run quote reactions are quanti-
ﬁed by impulse-response functions. As proposed by Hautsch and Huang (2009), this
framework allows us to estimate the impact of speciﬁc limit order activities including
limit order submissions, cancellations and executions (corresponding to trades) which
are represented as shocks to the system. Our empirical results show that the short-
run and long-run quote reaction patterns after the arrival of a limit order are indeed
quite similar to those, for example found for Euronext Amsterdam (see Hautsch and
Huang 2009). Buy (sell) limit orders cause permanent quote increases (decreases) and
a temporary decline of the spread. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the permanent impact of
a limit order posted at the best quote is in most cases approximately 25% of that of
a trade of similar size. However, this magnitude can be much smaller when hidden
orders are placed inside of the spread. As on other liquid markets, only aggressive limit
orders posted on the ﬁrst or second order level induce signiﬁcant price impacts whereas
orders posted with greater distance to the market have virtually no eﬀect.
3Finally, using the estimates of market impacts, we suggest a way to compute the
optimal size of a limit order given its expected price impact. The implied order size is
calculated by inverting the closed form of the permanent impact yielding a function of
the current limit order book and the given market impact control level. This provides
useful information to control risks in trading strategies.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 brieﬂy intro-
duces the market environment and the data. Section 3 provides an explorative analysis
of the order ﬂow. The econometric framework is reviewed in Section 4. Section 5
gives empirical evidence of short-run and long-run quote reactions on order activities.
In Section 6, we propose a method to compute the optimal order size subject to its
position in the book and the expected market impact. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Market Environment and Data
The NASDAQ stock market is the largest electronic stock market (in terms of trading
volume) in the world. In 2006, its traditional market center, Brut and INET electronic
communication networks (ECNs) are integrated into a single system. This system oﬀers
a single execution algorithm based on price and time order precedence for both market
makers and participants of ECNs. During the continuous trading period between 9:30
and 16:00 EST, limit orders are submitted to a centralized computer system where they
are matched to prevailing limit or hidden orders on the opposite side. If there is no
match or the standing volume in the system is insuﬃcient to fully execute the incoming
order, the remaining order volume is placed in the order book. NASDAQ supports
various order types like pure market orders (immediate order execution without a price
limit), stop orders (automatic issuing of limit orders or market orders when a given
price is reached), immediate-or-cancel (IOC) orders, reserve orders and non-display
orders, among others.
In this study, we use TotalView-ITCH data containing rich information on order
activities. The database includes limit order submissions, cancellations, executions
and hidden order executions for every trading day since 7:00am EST when the system
starts accepting incoming limit orders. The system is initialized by an empty order
book where all overnight limit orders are resubmitted automatically at the beginning
4of each day. Therefore, we can exactly reconstruct the order book at any time by ag-
gregating the existing visible limit orders according to their limit prices. Furthermore,
NASDAQ TotalView, surpassing NASDAQ Level 2, is the standard NASDAQ data
feed for displaying the full order book depth for market participants. Hence, the re-
constructed order book exactly represents historical real-time-disseminated order book
states. Trades are identiﬁed via the records of limit orders and hidden order executions.
Since the trading direction of limit orders and hidden orders is recorded, we can exactly
identify whether a trade is buyer-initiated or seller-initiated. Finally, TotalView-ITCH
data records a unique identiﬁcation of any limit order which allows to track the order
and to compute, for instance, its life-time.1
Note that a market order, especially when its order size is comparably large, is
likely to be ﬁlled by several pending limit orders. This results in multiple limit order
executions corresponding to a sequence of same-type (sub-)trades within a short time
interval. We identify transactions as sub-trades if they occur in less than half a second
after the previous trade and have the same initiation types. All corresponding sub-
trades are consolidated to a single trade representing a market order. Furthermore, to
avoid erratic eﬀects during the market opening and closure, our sample period covers
only the continuous trading periods between 9:45 and 15:45.
We select ten assets out of the 200 biggest stocks listed at NASDAQ according to
their market capitalization in Oct 1, 2010. To obtain a representative cross-section,
we ﬁrst divide the 200 stocks into twenty blocks, and then randomly select one stock
from each category. Table 1 summarizes fundamental characteristics of these stocks
extracted from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.
3 Major Order Flow and Order Book Characteristics
Electronic limit order book markets are characterized by high transparency and low
latency. They enable most market participants having a view on the current state of
the market via real-time updated order books. Traders’ instructions are transmitted
1The limit order book reconstruction and limit order tracking is performed by the software ”LOB-
STER” (see Huang and Polak 2011), which can be freely accessed at http://lobster.wiwi.hu-berlin.
de.
5Table 1: Summary Statistics of Selected Stocks
The variables are calculated for each stock using data from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) database. The sample period covers October, 2010, including 21 trading days.
MktCap is the market capitalization by October 1, 2010. AvgVol denotes the average daily
volume (in thousand shares). MedTurn is the median daily turnover. AvgPrc denotes the
average daily closing price. StdRet gives the standard deviation of daily returns.
MktCap AvgVol MedTurn AvgPrc StdRet
(billion $) (1000 shrs) (in %) (in $) (in %)
GOOG 130.13 4059.6 1.24 575.94 2.56
ADBE 13.66 15132 2.04 27.512 3.11
VRTX 7.02 1909.7 0.90 35.947 1.64
WFMI 6.38 3018.5 1.54 37.636 1.80
WCRX 5.66 2941.1 0.94 23.535 2.27
DISH 3.93 2486.5 1.12 19.412 1.38
UTHR 3.18 747.95 0.97 55.884 1.89
LKQX 2.99 430.38 0.26 21.465 1.21
PTEN 2.63 5445.5 3.26 18.536 2.35
STRA 2.37 514.49 2.55 145.42 4.24
to the trading platform and executed with extremely short time delays (usually only
a few milliseconds).2 As a consequence, sophisticated trading strategies minimizing
trading costs and exploiting high-frequency price movements are performed using com-
puter algorithms. Triggered by technological advances, systematic trading is highly
sophisticated nowadays. For instance, in order to make proﬁt from high-frequency
price ﬂuctuations and liquidity rebates, many high-frequency trading algorithms post
a huge number of limit orders which are again canceled almost immediately if not get-
ting executed. As a consequence, enormous limit order activities on extremely high
frequencies are observed.
Table 2 summarizes the limit order activities of selected stocks and Figure 1 shows
the histograms of constructed variables for one illustrating stock, Warner Chilcott plc
(ticker symbol WCRX).3 The following main ﬁndings can be summarized:
2There are indeed numerous brokers providing their clients direct market access (DMA).
3The corresponding histograms for other nine stocks are provided on the companion website http://
amor.cms.hu-berlin.de/huangrui/project/order_impact_nasdaq/. They conﬁrm that our ﬁndings
6Table 2: Limit Order Activities at NASDAQ
Calculated for each stock using TotalView-ITCH messages. The sample period covers October, 2010, including 21 trading days. NumLO is the
average daily number of standing limit orders. AvgSZ denotes the average size of limit orders. NumALO is the average daily number of limit orders
placed inside the spread (”aggressive” limit orders). NumALO (in %) gives the percentage of aggressive limit orders. NumExe is the number of
limit orders getting (possibly partially) executed. MedETim denotes the median execution time of limit orders. VWETim is the volume-weighted
execution time. NumCanc (in %) is the percentage of limit orders that are cancelled without (partial) execution. MedCTim denotes the median
cancellation time. NumACan (in %) is the cancellation rate of aggressive limit orders. MedACTim gives the median cancellation time of aggressive
limit orders.
NumLO AvgSZ NumALO NumALO NumExe MedETim VWETim NumCanc MedCTim NumACan MedACTim
(×10
3) (100 shrs) (×10
3) (in %) (×10
3) (sec.) (sec.) (in %) (sec.) (in %) (sec.)
GOOG 220.55 1.28 23.50 10.65 5.45 2.77 118.79 97.52 0.42 89.35 0.011
ADBE 206.05 2.48 2.38 1.15 15.28 3.07 107.68 92.57 4.38 50.87 0.351
VRTX 51.59 1.26 3.11 6.03 3.18 6.82 65.67 93.82 8.12 72.49 0.192
WFMI 109.46 1.53 8.06 7.36 5.19 5.92 87.04 95.25 5.88 86.43 0
WCRX 54.50 1.65 1.78 3.27 3.84 10.19 83.87 92.93 10 57.23 0.873
DISH 71.42 1.69 0.91 1.27 3.88 14.35 104.25 94.56 5.55 52.90 0.353
UTHR 27.44 1.20 3.31 12.06 1.22 6.04 52.35 95.54 9.87 81.40 0.352
LKQX 22.92 1.44 1.76 7.68 0.77 12.97 71.15 96.62 14.76 84.37 2.096
PTEN 91.57 1.98 1.81 1.98 7.66 5.71 77.56 91.62 4.84 53.80 0.545
STRA 13.05 1.12 4.02 30.83 0.57 4.89 89.11 95.57 5.17 90.96 1.502





















































Figure 1: Histogram of order sizes, execution sizes, cancellation times and execution times
of limit orders. The red line denotes kernel density estimates. Zero cancellation times and
execution times are discarded. Trading of WCRX on NASDAQ in October, 2010.
8(i) Market participants submit a huge number of limit orders with small sizes. The
average limit order size is approximately 156 shares. The up-left plot in Fig-
ure 1 shows that a large proportion of limit orders have a size of 100 shares,
corresponding to a round lot on NASDAQ.
(ii) Most of the limit orders are posted at or behind the market. We observe that
only approximately 8.2% of the limit orders are placed within the spread and
thus update the best quotes.
(iii) Only few limit orders are executed. The average execution time across the ten
stocks is approximately 7 seconds. However, the volume-weighted average execu-
tion time is substantially greater than its median, reﬂecting the fact that large
limit orders face signiﬁcantly higher execution risk than small orders.
(iv) More than 95% of limit orders are cancelled without (partial) execution. The
median cancellation time of aggressive limit orders placed inside of the spread
is less than one second. Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) argue that such a high
cancellation rate of limit orders at NASDAQ mainly results from traders ’pinging’
for hidden liquidity in the market.
Note that the quickly canceled limit orders change the order book but reverse it back
immediately. This nearly instantaneous change is virtually unobservable for humans
but can be captured only by trading algorithms run by high-speed computers connecting
to exchanges with very low latency.4 Though such limit order activities do not generally
provide any liquidity to the market, they are indispensable for analyzing order book
dynamics.
Table 3 gives summary statistics of market order activities. The number of market
orders is substantially smaller than the number of (incoming) limit orders. Interestingly,
most market orders are ﬁlled by standing limit or hidden orders pending at prices better
than or equal to the best quote. Hence, we hardly ﬁnd market orders walking through
the order book.
are quite consistent across the market.
4As a matter of fact, ITCH-Totalview has already reserved time stamps in nano-second precision in
order to potentially increase the time resolution in the near future.
9Table 3: Market Order Activities
Calculated for each stock using TotalView-ITCH messages. The sample period covers Octo-
ber, 2010, including 21 trading days. NumMO is the average daily number of market orders.
AvgSZ denotes the average size of market orders. NumIS (in %) is the percentage of market
orders completley ﬁlled by hidden orders placed in the spread. NumL1 (in %) is the percentage
of market orders ﬁlled at the best displayed quote. NumL2 (in %) is the percentage of market
orders walking through the book up to the second level. NumL3 (in %) is the percentage of
market orders walking through the book up to (or deeper than) the third level.
NumMO AvgSZ NumIS NumL1 NumL2 NumL3
(100 shrs) (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %)
GOOG 6226.4 1.66 43.3 53.8 2.10 0.42
ADBE 4169.1 6.93 4.8 94.9 0.24 0.01
VRTX 1730.0 2.68 13.0 86.4 0.43 0.02
WFMI 2285.7 3.27 7.2 92.2 0.38 0.04
WCRX 1977.0 3.15 8.5 91.0 0.44 0.01
DISH 1339.1 4.45 4.6 95.2 0.15 0
UTHR 857.1 2.16 26.3 72.9 0.67 0
LKQX 469.8 2.23 15.9 83.7 0.29 0.02
PTEN 2647.2 5.36 4.9 95.0 0.07 0
STRA 657.9 1.51 39.8 58.6 1.11 0.12
Table 4 gives descriptive statistics of the order book data used in the paper. We
observe signiﬁcantly more order book updates in the ﬁrst three order levels than trans-
actions. Moreover, on average, second level market depth is higher than the ﬁrst level
depth while it is lower than the depth on the third level.
4 An Econometric Model for the Market Impact of Limit
Orders
To estimate the market impact of limit orders, we apply the framework proposed by
Hautsch and Huang (2009). The major idea is to model the limit order book in terms
of a cointegrated VAR model for quotes and order book depth and to back out the
price impact of speciﬁc types of limit orders based on impulse response functions.
10Table 4: Summary of Order Books
The variables are calculated for each stock using reconstructed order book data. The sample period covers October, 2010, including 21 trading
days. AvgObs(×103) is the average number of observations per day. AvgTrd is the average number of daily trades. AvgAsk is the average of the
best ask quote in order books. AvgBid is the average of the best bid quote. AvgSpr (in $) is the average dollar spread in cents. AvgSpr (in %) is
the average relative spread. L1 – L3 denotes the average pending volume on the best quote up to the third best quote.
AvgObs AvgTrd AvgAsk AvgBid AvgSpr AvgSpr depth on ask (100 shrs) depth on bid (100 shrs)
(×10
3) (×10
3) (in $) (in $) (in cents) (in %) L1 L2 L3 L1 L2 L3
GOOG 96.97 3.66 572.45 572.17 28.74 0.051 2.05 1.70 1.56 2.01 1.70 1.58
ADBE 139.52 3.95 27.336 27.325 1.51 0.055 32.87 48.34 63.86 28.86 45.29 61.51
VRTX 39.79 1.51 35.913 35.895 2.25 0.063 4.48 5.19 7.764 4.12 5.13 7.80
WFMI 76.28 2.13 37.59 37.576 1.85 0.049 5.82 8.76 13.61 5.60 8.35 12.56
WCRX 43.32 1.81 23.57 23.558 1.81 0.076 9.22 11.71 15.95 8.31 10.95 15.40
DISH 62.70 1.26 19.396 19.385 1.52 0.078 15.36 18.85 27.88 16.18 18.68 26.54
PTEN 80.33 6.44 18.677 18.666 6.39 0.114 17.02 23.67 28.71 16.65 22.18 27.24
LKQX 19.17 4.01 21.464 21.441 2.70 0.126 3.39 3.96 5.02 3.36 4.18 5.44
UTHR 18.92 2.51 56.083 56.026 1.50 0.080 2.20 2.13 2.40 2.06 2.01 2.18
STRA 16.26 0.40 145.25 144.77 53.33 0.364 1.75 2.09 2.85 1.50 1.68 2.05
1
14.1 A Cointegrated VAR Model for the Limit Order Book
Denote t as a (business) time index, indicating all order book activities, i.e., incoming
limit or market orders as well as limit order cancellations. Furthermore, pa
t and pb
t





t , j = 1,...,k, deﬁne the log depth on the j-th best observed quote
level on the ask and bid side, respectively. Moreover, to capture dynamic interactions
between limit order and market order activities, we deﬁne two dummy variables, BUYt
and SELLt, indicating the occurrence of buy and sell trades. Then, the resulting
















t are not observed on a ﬁxed grid at and be-
hind the best quotes. Consequently, their price distance to pa
t and pb
t is not necessarily
exactly j −1 ticks but might be higher if there are no limit orders on all possible inter-
mediate price levels behind the market. However, Table 3 shows that trades “walking
through the book”, i.e., trades absorbing more than one price level in the limit order
book occur extremely rarely. Consequently, we expect that an augmentation of the
system by the inclusion of level-speciﬁc limit prices does not provide signiﬁcantly addi-
tional information but just increases the dimension and the complexity of the system.
Note that market depth enters the vector yt in levels and thus is treated as a possibly
non-stationary variable. Since market depth is highly persistent and (on very high
frequencies) reveals features of a near-unit-root process, Hautsch and Huang (2009)
recommend treating this variable as being possibly non-stationary. This guarantees
consistency of estimates, even if market depth is truly stationary.
Following Hautsch and Huang (2009) we model the process in terms of a restricted
cointegrated VAR model of the order p (VAR(p)) with the Vector Error Correction
(VEC) form for ∆yt := yt − yt−1,
∆yt = µ + αβ′yt−1 +
p−1  
i=1
γi∆yt−i + ut, (2)
where ut is white noise with covariance matrix σu, µ is a constant, γi with i = 1,...,p−
1, is a k×k parameter matrix, and α and β denote the k×r loading and cointegrating
12Table 5: Representative estimates of cointegrating vectors
The vectors are sorted according to their corresponding eigenvalues in Johansen’s ML ap-
proach. Overall there are nine cointegrating vectors. Two of them are known, i.e., β1 =
[0,...,0,1,0] and β2 = [0,...,0,0,1], representing the stationary trading indicators. Accord-
ingly, the elements corresponding to BUY and SELL, in   β3 to   β9 are set to zero and are
omitted as well. Trading of WRCX at NASDAQ on October 1, 2010.
Variable ˆ β3 ˆ β4 ˆ β5 ˆ β6 ˆ β7 ˆ β8 ˆ β9
pa 1.00 -1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 -0.64 -0.97
pb -0.98 0.99 -0.99 -0.99 -1.00 1.00 1.00
va,1 0.00 -0.25 -0.01 -0.12 -0.03 -0.03 0.02
va,2 -0.00 0.26 0.06 -0.11 0.00 -0.34 0.03
va,3 0.00 -0.18 -0.04 0.19 0.09 -0.54 0.02
vb,1 0.01 0.16 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.02
vb,2 -0.01 -0.17 0.05 0.15 -0.07 0.37 0.01
vb,3 0.01 0.11 -0.02 -0.10 0.13 0.73 -0.00
matrices with r < k. By treating the trading indicators BUYt and SELLt as stationary
variables, the two ﬁrst columns of β are restricted to β1 = [0,...,0,1,0]′ and β2 =
[0,...,0,0,1]′.
The corresponding reduced VAR representation in levels of yt is given by
yt = µ +
p  
i=1
aiyt−i + ut, (3)
where a1 := Ik + αβ′ + γ1 with Ik denoting a k × k identity matrix, ai := γi − γi−1
with 1 < i < p and ap := −γp−1. As illustrated by Hautsch and Huang (2009), the
model (2) can be estimated by full information maximum likelihood (FIML) according
to Johansen (1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990).
Table 5 shows the estimated cointegrating vectors for a representative trading day,
where we omit the two known cointegrating vectors associated with the (stationary)
trading indicators and all corresponding elements in the remaining cointegration vec-
tors. The resulting vectors are ordered according to their corresponding eigenvalues
reﬂecting their likelihood contributions.
13We observe that the ﬁrst ﬁve and the last cointegration relations are mostly linear
combinations of spreads and depths. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst one is quite similar to a
linear combination mimicking the bid-ask spread. The most interesting relationship is
implied by the vector ˆ β8, revealing relatively large (and diﬀerent) coeﬃcients associated
with the depth variables. This indicates that depth has a signiﬁcant impact on the
long-term relationship between quotes. Intuitively, the connection between ask and
bid quotes becomes weaker (and thus deviates from the spread) if the depth is less
balanced between both sides of the market. Hence, depth has a signiﬁcant impact
on quote dynamics and should be explicitly taken into account in a model for quotes.
These results strongly conﬁrm corresponding ﬁndings by Hautsch and Huang (2009)
for trading at Euronext.
Finally, note that model (3) can be further rotated in order to represent dynamics
in spreads, relative spread changes, midquotes, midquote returns as well as (ask-bid)
depth imbalances. Hence, the model is suﬃciently ﬂexible to capture the high-frequency
dynamics of all relevant trading variables. In this sense, the approach complements
dynamic models for order book curves such as proposed by H¨ ardle, Hautsch, and Mihoci
(2009) and Russell and Kim (2010).
4.2 Estimating Market Impact
The market impact of limit orders can be backed out by representing an incoming order
as a shock to the dynamic order book system as speciﬁed in equation (3). Whenever
an order enters the market, it (i) will change the depth in the book, (ii) may change
the best quotes depending on which position in the queue it is placed, and (iii) will
change the trading indicator dummy in case of a market order. Consequently, the direct




where δp denotes a 2 × 1 vector containing shocks in quotes, δv is a 2k × 1 vector
representing shocks in depths, and δd denotes a 2 × 1 vector containing changes of the
trading indicator dummy.
Following Hautsch and Huang (2009), we design the impulse response vectors as-
sociated with four scenarios commonly faced by market participants. As graphically
illustrated by Figures 2 to 4, a three-level order book is initialized at the best ask
14pa
t = 1002, best bid pb
t = 1000, second best ask 1003, second best bid 999, and depth
levels on the bid side v
b,1
t = 1, v
b,2


























Figure 2 (Scenario 1a (normal limit order)): An incoming buy limit order with price
1000 and size 0.5. It aﬀects only the depth at the best bid without changing the prevailing
quotes or resulting in a trade. Figure from Hautsch and Huang (2009).
Scenario 1a (normal limit order): arrival of a buy limit order with price 1000 and
size 0.5 to be placed at the market. As shown in Figure 2, this order will be
consolidated at the best bid without changing the prevailing quotes. Because the
initial depth on the ﬁrst level is 1.0, the change of the log depth is ln(1.5) ≈ 0.4.
Correspondingly, the shock vectors are given by δv = [0,0,0,0.4,0,0]′, δp = δd =
[0,0]′.
Scenario 1b (passive limit order): arrival of a buy limit order with price 999 and
size 0.5 to be posted behind the market. As in the scenario above, it does not
change the prevailing quotes and only aﬀects the depth at the second best bid.
We have δv = [0,0,0,0,ln(2) − ln(1.5) ≈ 0.29,0]′, δp = δd = [0,0]′.
Scenario 2 (aggressive limit order): arrival of a buy limit order with price 1001

























Figure 3 (Scenario 2 (aggressive limit order)): An incoming buy limit order with price
1001 and size 0.5 improving the best bid and changing all depth levels on the bid side of the






















Figure 4 (Scenario 3 (normal market order)): An incoming buy market order with price
1002 and size 0.5 which results in a buyer-initiated (buy) trade. Figure from Hautsch and
Huang (2009).
16Table 6: Shock Vectors Implied by the Underlying Four Scenarios
Initial order book: best ask pa
t = 1002, best bid pb
t = 1000, second best ask = 1003, second
best bid = 999. Volumes on the ask/bid side: v
a/b,1
t = 1 at the best bid, v
a/b,2
t = 1.5 at




t = 1.4 at the third and fourth best bids, respectively.
Notation: δv denotes changes in market depths; δp denotes changes of the best bid and best
ask; δd denotes changes of the trading indicator variables. Figure from Hautsch and Huang
(2009)





‘normal limit order’ (Bid,1000,0.5) [0,0,0,0.4,0,0] [0,0] [0,0]
‘passive limit order’ (Bid,999,0.5) [0,0,0,0,0.29,0] [0,0] [0,0]
‘aggressive limit order’ (Bid,1001,0.5) [0,0,0,−0.69,−0.4,0.07] [0,0.001] [0,0]
‘normal market order’ (Bid,1002,0.5) [−0.69,0,0,0,0,0] [0,0] [1,0]
and size 0.5 to be posted inside of the current spread. Figure 3 shows that it im-
proves the best bid by 0.1% and accordingly shifts all depth levels on the bid side.
The resulting shock vector is given by δv = [0,0,0,(ln(0.5) ≈ −0.69),(ln(1/1.5) ≈
−0.4),(ln(1.5/1.4) ≈ 0.07)]′, δp = [0,0.001]′ and δd = [0,0]′.
Scenario 3 (normal market order): arrival of a buy order with price 1002 and size
0.5. This order will be immediately executed against standing limit orders at
the best ask quote. Because it absorbs liquidity from the book, it shocks the
corresponding depth levels negatively. Figure 4 depicts the corresponding changes
of the order book as represented by δv = [ln(0.5) ≈ −0.69,0,0,0,0,0]′, δp = [0,0]′
and δd = [1,0]′.
Table 6 summarizes the shock vectors implied by the illustrating scenarios.
The market reactions induced by incoming limit orders are captured by the impulse
response function,
f(h;δy) = E[yt+h|yt + δy,yt−1,···] − E[yt+h|yt,yt−1,···], (4)




17and h is the number of periods (measured in ‘order event time’).
Note that the impulse responses need not to be orthogonalized as contemporane-
ous relationships between quotes and depths are captured by construction of the shock
vector. Moreover, our data is based on the arrival time of orders avoiding time ag-
gregation as another source of mutual dependence in high-frequency order book data.
The impulse-response function according to equation (4) can be written as

















      
Kp×Kp
.
Given the consistent estimator   a for a := vec(A1,...,Ap) in (3) we have
√
T(  a − a)
d → N(0,Σb a).
L¨ utkepohl (1990) shows that the asymptotic distribution of the impulse-response func-
tion is given by
√
T( ˆ f − f)
d → N(0,GhΣb aG′
h), (6)









The permanent impact of limit order can be deduced from Ganger’s representation
of the cointegrated VAR as
¯ f(δy) := lim
h→∞
















185 Market Impact at NASDAQ
We model the best quotes and market depths up to the third level. Computational
burden is reduced by separately estimating the model fore each of the 21 trading
days. The market impact is then computed as the monthly average of individual
(daily) impulse response. Likewise, conﬁdence intervals are computed based on daily
averages. For sake of brevity we refrain from presenting all individual results for the
ten stocks. We rather illustrate representative evidence based on Warner Chilcott
plc (ticker symbol WCRX) using a cointegrated VAR(10) model. The results for the
remaining stocks are provided in a web appendix on http://amor.cms.hu-berlin.
de/~huangrui/project/order_impact_nasdaq/.










































Buy LO → Ask
Buy LO → Bid
Sell LO → Ask
Sell LO → Bid
95% confidence interval
Permanent Impact
Figure 5: Changes of ask and bid quotes induced by buy/sell limit orders placed at the market
(level one) with a size equal to the half of the depth on the ﬁrst level. The marked number on the
vertical axes indicates the magnitude of the permanent impact. The blue dotted lines indicate
the corresponding 95%-conﬁdence intervals. Trading of WCRX at NASDAQ in October 2010.
LO: limit order.
Figure 5 depicts the market impact of buy and sell limit orders posted at the best
quotes as shown in Scenario 1 in Section 4.2.6 The impact starts at zero since such
a limit order does not directly change quotes. As expected, both ask and bid quotes
signiﬁcantly rise (decline) after the arrival of a buy (sell) limit order. In the long-run,
both quotes converge to a permanent level at which the information content of the
6In all ﬁgures in this section, the notation ‘A → B’ is interpreted as ‘the impact on B induced by
A’.
19incoming limit order is completely incorporated. We observe that the long-run price
change is approximately 0.3 basis points. In the short-run, ask and bid quotes adjust
in an asymmetric way where bid (ask) quotes tend to react more quickly than ask
(bid) quotes after the arrival of a buy (sell) limit order. This adjustment induces an
one-sided and temporary decrease of the bid-ask spread.
The signiﬁcant permanent impact induced by an incoming limit order indicates
that it contributes to price discovery. Thus, market participants perceive that limit
orders carry private information which is in contrast to the common assumption in
theoretical literature that informed traders only take liquidity but do not provide it.
On the other hand, it is supported by the experiment by Bloomﬁeld, O’Hara, and Saar
(2005) showing that informed traders use order strategies involving both market orders
and limit orders to optimally capitalize their informational advantage.









































L1 buy LO → Bid
L2 buy LO → Bid
L3 buy LO → bid
Permanent Impact
Figure 6: Changes of bid quotes induced by buy limit orders placed at the market (level one)
and behind the market (level two and three). The order size equals half of that at the best
bid. The initial order book equals the corresponding monthly average shown in Table 4. The
marked number on the vertical axes indicates the magnitude of the permanent impact. Trading
of WCRX at NASDAQ in October, 2010. L1: level one. L2: level two. L3: level three. LO:
limit order.
To explore the role of the order’s position in the book, Figure 6 depicts the impact
on the bid quote induced by a buy limit order placed at the market (level one) and
20behind the market (level two and three). We observe that the magnitude and speed of
the quote reaction are negatively correlated with the order’s distance from the spread.
Speciﬁcally, for orders posted deeper than the third level in the order book, virtually
no market impacts can be identiﬁed.









































Buy LO → Ask
Buy LO → Bid
Permanent Impact







































Small buy LO → Bid
 Mid buy LO → Bid
Big buy LO → Bid
Permanent Impact
Figure 7: Left: Changes of quotes induced by buy limit orders placed inside of the spread with
a size equal to the depth at the bid. Right: Changes of bid quote induced by buy limit orders
placed inside of the spread with diﬀerent sizes. The initial order book equals the corresponding
monthly average shown in Table 4. Small size: depth at the bid. Mid size: 7 times of the
depth at the bid. Big size: 15 times of the depth at the bid. Trading of WCRX at NASDAQ
in October, 2010. LO: limit order.
Limit orders placed inside the spread perturb the order book dynamics in a more
complex way as show in Scenario 2 in Section 4.2. They directly improve the ask or
bid resulting in an immediate narrowing of the spread and a shift of one side of the
order book. Hence, the system seeks the new equilibrium on a path recovering from
an immediate quote change and a simultaneous re-balancing of liquidity. Figure 7
shows the reactions of bid and ask quotes induced by an aggressive buy limit order.
Given our setting, a buy limit order induces a 4.3 basis point increase of the bid quote
(corresponding to approximately one cent). However, the long-run price change is
just 2.11 basis points. The immediate quote reversal is induced either by sell trades
picking up the volume or by cancellations on the bid side. Likewise the ask quote shifts
upward. We hence observe an asymmetric re-balancing of quotes and a corresponding
21re-widening of the spread.
The right plot of Figure 7 shows how the size of incoming aggressive limit orders
aﬀects quote reactions. In case of a comparably small order, the posted volume is
likely to be quickly picked up or cancelled, shifting back the bid quote. In contrast,
large volumes over-bid the prevailing quote causing a signiﬁcant long-run impact. This
conﬁrms ﬁndings by Hautsch and Huang (2009) for Euronext Amsterdam and shows
that aggressive limit orders with large order sizes carry information and serve as pricing
signals.




































Buy MO → Ask
 Buy MO → Bid
Buy LO → Ask
Buy LO → Bid
Permanent Impact
Figure 8: Changes of ask and bid quotes induced by a buy market order and a buy limit
order of similar size placed at the market. The order size is half of the depth at the best bid.
The initial order book equals the corresponding monthly average shown in Table 4. Trading of
WCRX at NASDAQ in October, 2010. LO: limit order; MO: market order.
Figure 8 compares the market impact induced by a buy market order and a similar
buy limit order posted at the bid. We observe that both bid and ask quotes sharply
increase after the arrival of a buy market order. The permanent shift of quotes induced
by a market order is approximately 4 times greater than that by an incoming limit
order. This ﬁnding supports theoretical predictions by Rosu (2010). Moreover, in
case of a market order, the ask reacts more quickly than the bid. Hence, we observe
an asymmetric adjustment of the two sides of the market resulting in a temporary
widening of spreads.
22Since the market impact of limit orders depends not only on the market microstruc-
ture but also on the characteristics of the individual stock, an ultimate comparison of
estimated market impacts on NASDAQ with those on Euronext (see Hautsch and
Huang (2009)) is rather diﬃcult. Nevertheless, we do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence when
comparing the market impact of trades to that of limit orders. While on Euronext
Hautsch and Huang (2009) ﬁnd robust evidence for the market impact of trades trad-
ing at best quotes being approximately four times of the market impact of a limit order
of similar size, this does not necessarily hold for all stocks at NASDAQ, such as, e.g.,
GOOG, STRA and UTHR. We explain this ﬁnding by the existence of hidden liquidity
inside of bid-ask spreads as shown in Table 3. When the market participant expects
a better price than the best quote to be available inside of the spread, she would nat-
urally interpret a market order placed at the best quotes as being comparably more
aggressive as it walks through the (hidden) price levels. As a consequence, the reaction
to an incoming market order becomes stronger. Similarly, an incoming limit order is
interpreted as being comparably more passive. Consequently, the market impact of
limit orders decreases.
6 Optimal Order Size
The expected price impact induced by a limit order placement is a key parameter in
trading decisions. Therefore, in trading strategies, it might be of particular interest
to explicitly control the expected market impact. The estimates of the price impact
provided in the previous section can be used to back out the size of an order (given its
position in the queue) which is necessary to cause a given expected price impact.
In fact, due to the discreteness of prices, the magnitude of a price impact can be
interpreted in a probabilistic context. Given a minimum tick size at equity markets
like NASDAQ, a practitioner who prefers not to shift the price with probability ξ
must design the order such that the expected price shift, i.e., the magnitude of the
impact, is less than 1 − ξ ticks. This is straightforwardly seen by noticing that when
23the probability is exactly ξ, the minimum level of the market impact is
permanent market impact = E[long-run price shift]
= ξ × (0 ticks) + (1 − ξ) × (1 ticks)
= 1 − ξ (ticks).
(10)
In the following we shall illustrate how to explicitly compute the optimal order size
subject to the given control level ξ. For ease of illustration, consider a bid limit order
with size m placed at the second best bid. In our setting based on a 3-level order book,
it is represented as a 10-dimensional shock vector with only one non-zero element at





















where c29 is the ninth element in the second row of matrix C in (9). Plugging (11) into










× (depth at second best bid). (12)
Figure 9 depicts the permanent impact on bid prices against order sizes for the ten
selected stocks. Each curve in the sub-plots presents the permanent impact induced by
the particular type of bid limit order, i.e., “limit orders placed at the second best bid”,
“limit orders placed at the best bid” and “limit orders placed inside of the spread”.
The order book is initialized at its average. For the sake of clarity, we change the
unit of impacts (on the y−axis) from basis points of bid prices to the number of ticks.
Furthermore, the control level ξ is set to 0.9 (corresponding to a permanent market
impact of 0.1 ticks) represented by the horizontal dashed line. The intersections S1
and S2 correspond to optimal sizes of limit orders placed on the best bid and second
best bid, respectively. For instance, for WCRX and subject to the condition that the
market impact is less than 0.1 cent, the optimal size for a limit order placed at the
best bid is around 600 shares. Likewise, the optimal size for a limit order placed at the
second bid is around 1400 shares.

























































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9: Permanent impacts against order sizes. The impacts are induced by bid orders.
The initial order book is set to its monthly average. The order sizes at the x−axis range from
100 shares to 5 times of the depth at the best bid in the initial order book . The aggressive
(in-the-spread) limit orders improve the bid price by 1 cent. The horizontal dashed line presents
a subject control level corresponding to a permanent market impact of 0.1 cents. Trading of
ten selected stocks at NASDAQ in October, 2010.
25For the stocks GOOG, UTHR and STRA, we observe that the market impact is
so large that the intersection S1 corresponds to an order size of less than 100 shares.
We explain this phenomenon by three reasons. First, the depth at the best bid is
comparably small. Therefore, a 100-shares-order is a relatively large order given the
available liquidity at the market. Second, as shown in Table 1, prices of these stocks
are relatively high. Consequently, the relative minimum tick size is comparably small
implying lower costs of front-running strategies. Hence, the high market impact reﬂects
a high probability of being aﬀected by front-running. Third, the average absolute
spread in ticks is large. Consequently, there is more room for other market participants
to improve their quotes.
Finally, for some stocks, we observe zero or even negative permanent impacts of
small orders placed inside of the spread, as, e.g., GOOG, ADBE, DISH, PTEN and
STRA. This is caused by the eﬀect that small limit orders placed inside of the spread
are mainly submitted by trading algorithms and tend to be canceled very quickly if
not getting executed. In other situations, they might be quickly picked up and trigger
other algorithms issuing market orders and/or canceling existing limit orders on their
own side.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide new empirical evidence on limit order submissions and market
impacts in NASDAQ trading. Employing TotalView-ITCH data, we can summarize
the following major ﬁndings. First, we observe huge numbers of order submissions per
day with order sizes clustering around round lots. Second, most of the limit orders
are cancelled before getting executed. Cancellation times are hardly greater than one
second. Third, the volume-weighted execution time of limit orders is substantially
greater than its median indicating that big limit orders face clearly more execution
risk. Finally, we observe that only very few market orders tend to ’walk through the
book’.
We ﬁnd the short-run and long-run price reactions induced by limit order placements
to be consistent with those found by Hautsch and Huang (2009) for data stemming from
the Euronext Amsterdam. This implies that these eﬀects are quite stable across mar-
26kets, despite of diﬀerences in market settings. In particular, we ﬁnd that incoming limit
order have signiﬁcant short-run and long-run eﬀects on ask and bid quotes. Buy (sell)
limit orders increase (decrease) both ask and bid quotes while temporarily decreasing
bid-ask spreads. Similar but stronger eﬀects are found after arrivals of market orders
with temporary increases of bid-ask spreads. For aggressive limit orders posted in the
spread we ﬁnd diﬀerent eﬀects depending on the order size. While the new quote level
caused by a large aggressive order also holds in the long run, this is not true for small
orders. Their direct eﬀect on quotes tend to be reversed after a while as the order is
picked up. Moreover, it turns out that only limit orders posted up to the second order
level have signiﬁcant market impacts. Orders which are placed even deeper in the book
have virtually no eﬀect on the market. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that small orders placed
inside of the spread cause zero or even negative long-run impacts. We explain this
ﬁnding by the existence of trading algorithms which cancel such orders very quickly if
they do not get executed.
Finally, we illustrate how to use the setup to compute optimal sizes of limit orders
given a certain intended price impact. This might be helpful to control the risk in
trading strategies.
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